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Single Idea 8886

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem ]

Full Idea

The claim that someone knows a proposition if it is true, it is believed, and the person is justified in their belief is false, in that the conditions do not state a sufficient condition for the claim.

Gist of Idea

Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge

Source

Edmund L. Gettier (Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? [1963], p.145)

Book Ref

'Knowledge and Belief', ed/tr. Griffiths,A.Phillips [OUP 1968], p.144

A Reaction

This is the beginning of the famous Gettier Problem, which has motivated most epistemology for the last forty years. Gettier implies that justification is necessary, even if it is not sufficient. He gives two counterexamples.

The 13 ideas with the same theme [mere true justified belief doesn't ensure knowledge]:

6444 True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
5430 A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell]
5429 True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell]
8886 Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier]
20225 For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski]
20226 Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski]
20228 We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski]
20227 Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski]
19004 Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
19699 A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
19728 Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]